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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), the Utah Supreme 
Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals by order 
dated April 7, 1993. (R. 0651) This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The primary issue on this appeal is as follows: 
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment 
against Mrs. Davis who, after nearly five years, had failed to adduce 
any medical expert testimony that the iron in question had proxi-
mately caused her dermatitis? 
Subsidiary issues are: 
(1) Did the trial court err in refusing to compel Black 
and Decker to perform analyses to determine the chemical composition 
of each and every component of Black and Decker's product? 
(2) Did the trial court err in refusing to strike the 
affidavit of Dr. Leonard J. Swinyer, Black and Decker's expert 
witness, who rendered his opinion that the Black and Decker iron was 
not the cause of Mrs. Davis' problems? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. Summary Judgment. 
Summary judgment is proper when pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file show no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Appellate courts review the trial 
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court's actions under a correctness standard giving no deference to 
the trial court's conclusion that facts are not in dispute or to the 
trial court's legal conclusions. Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., Inc., 821 
P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991). Doubts or uncertainties concerning 
issues of fact properly presented, or the nature of inferences to be 
drawn from the facts are to be construed in a light favorable to the 
party opposing the motion. Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 
(Utah 1983). However, bare allegations unsupported by facts raise no 
material issues. Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P. 2d 445, 446 
(Utah App. 1989). 
B. Discovery Rulings. 
Appellate courts recognize that the trial court has 
considerable latitude in discovery matters and therefore accord 
deference to the trial court's rulings. Reviewing courts will 
interfere with the trial court's discovery rulings only where the 
trial court has abused its discretion. Schonev v. Memorial Estates, 
Inc. , 790 P.2d 584, 585 (Utah App. 1990); State, Road Commission, v. 
Petty, 412 P.2d 914, 918 (Utah 1966); Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 1992). 
C. Expert Testimony. 
The trial court has considerable discretion in determining 
whether an expert is qualified to give an opinion. Reviewing courts 
reverse only where the trial court has abused its discretion. Wessel 
v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985); Maltbv v. 
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Cox Construction Co. , Inc., 598 P.2d 336, 340 (Utah 1979); Utah Dept. 
of Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Utah 1984) , 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case. 
This is a rather unusual product liability action wherein 
Mrs. Davis seeks damages for contact dermatitis allegedly caused by 
a Black and Decker iron. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Mrs. Davis filed her complaint on December 20, 1989, 
alleging an injury occurring in December, 1987. (R. 0002, 006-007) 
On August 6, 1992, Black and Decker moved for summary 
judgment on the basis that there was nothing in the record to support 
Mrs. Davis' allegations as to causation. (R. 0357-0376) Mrs. Davis' 
treating physicians had testified during discovery that they could 
not causally connect the Black and Decker iron with Mrs. Davis' skin 
problems. (R. 0693, pp. 19-22; R. 0694, p. 8) Dr. Leonard Swinyer, 
Black and Decker's expert, concluded that the likely cause of Mrs. 
Davis' problems was formaldehyde resin used in the manufacture of her 
clothing. (R. 0373-0376) 
Despite the fact that she and her husband (who is also her 
attorney) had first suspected the iron in December, 1987 (R. 004, 
007), Mrs. Davis through her counsel nonetheless acknowledged both 
before and at the 1992 hearing on the motion that Mrs. Davis had no 
medical evidence connecting the iron to her dermatitis. (R. 0386, 
0610) 
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The trial court entered summary judgment on October 14, 
1992. (R. 0593-0594) Mrs. Davis filed this appeal on November 9, 
1992. (R. 0595) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. On December 17, 1987, plaintiff purchased a Black and 
Decker Classic metal iron. (R. 0019) 
2. Mrs. Davis alleges in this action that when she clean-
ed the iron prior to using it, it emitted toxic fumes. Furthermore, 
she avers that the toxic fumes not only caused her to have a panic 
attack but also contaminated her skin. (R. 0019-0021, 0695 p. 25-26) 
3. Mrs. Davis also claims that the iron contained toxic 
chemical residues that were pressed into her clothing, further 
contaminating her skin. (R. 0022) 
4. Plaintiff claims that as a result of her contact with 
the iron, all fabrics that touch her skin cause her to have reac-
tions. (R. 0695 p. 65) 
5. Mrs. Davis also asserts that she was forced to spend 
at least one-half of every day naked because the iron made it 
impossible for her to wear most clothing. (R. 0695, p. 65) 
6. Mrs. Davis continued to use the iron for approximately 
two and one-half years, despite her claimed belief that the chemicals 
from the iron were causing her skin condition. (R. 0695, p. 47) 
7. On February 5, 1988, Mrs. Davis began seeing Dr. Leo 
Sotiriou, a physician who had been practicing as a dermatologist for 
ten years. (R. 0693, pp. 4-6; R. 0695, p. 67) 
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8. Dr. Sotiriou diagnosed contact dermatitis with 
possible atopic eczema and strongly recommended that plaintiff 
undergo patch testing. (R. 0693, pp. 13, 18-19) 
9. Dr. Sotiriou understood that plaintiff did not follow 
his recommendation to receive the patch testing, despite the fact 
that at least two other doctors had also recommended patch testing. 
(R. 0693, p. 19) 
10. Dr. Sotiriou stated that he had not found any medical 
authority to support Mrs. Davis' claims that the Black and Decker 
iron caused her problems. Consequently, Dr. Sotiriou was not willing 
to state that the iron was responsible for her alleged injuries. 
(R. 0693, pp. 19-22) 
11. On July 10, 1989, Mrs. Davis went to Dr. Kristin M. 
Leiferman at the Mayo Clinic. Dr. Leiferman recommended that Mrs. 
Davis enter the hospital for further treatment and continued 
evaluation. Mrs. Davis did not follow Dr. Leiferman's advice and did 
not return to the Mayo Clinic. (R. 0694, Exhibit 5) 
12. On September 6, 1989, Mrs. Davis saw Dr. John Joseph 
Zone, the Chief of the Division of Dermatology at the University of 
Utah Medical Center. (R. 0694, pp. 3, 4) 
13. While reviewing Mrs. Davis' medical records, Dr. Zone 
discovered that Mrs. Davis had been treated for identical contact 
dermatitis bv Dr. Don Reese at the University of Utah Medical Center 
on October 19, 1983, four years prior to purchasing the Black and 
Decker iron. Dr. Zone also discovered that Dr. Reese had scheduled 
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plaintiff for patch testing on November 9, 1983. Mrs. Davis did not 
keep that appointment. (R. 0694, pp. 11-24 and Exhibits 8-9) 
14. Dr. Zone recommended that Mrs. Davis receive patch 
testing and scheduled her for another appointment on September 13, 
1989. She neither returned for her scheduled appointment nor 
obtained the recommended patch testing. (R. 0694, pp. 26-28) 
15. When asked if he had an opinion as to whether Mrs. 
Davis' problems were related to the Black and Decker iron, Dr. Zone 
stated his "tendency was to say that [the iron and the injuries] were 
not related." (R. 0694, p. 8) 
16. On February 5, 1991, Mrs. Davis was scheduled to see 
Dr. Frances Storrs at Oregon State University Health Sciences in 
Portland, Oregon. Dr. Storrs is a specialist in contact dermatitis. 
The medical evidence indicates that Mrs. Davis did not keep that 
appointment. (R. 0695, pp. 70-71) 
17. On February 25, 1992, under court order, Mrs. Davis 
was seen by Dr. Leonard J. Swinyer for an independent medical 
examination. Dr. Swinyer is a board certified dermatologist and is 
considered one of the leading experts in contact dermatitis and 
contact eczema in Salt Lake City. (R. 0273, 0373-0374; Addendum 1) 
18. Dr. Swinyer reviewed Mrs. Davis' medical records, 
photographs she supplied, the depositions of Mrs. Davis, Dr. Zone and 
Dr. Sotiriou, and a personal medical history written by Mrs. Davis. 
(R. 0374) 
19. Dr. Swinyer conducted a thorough examination, and 
determined Mrs. Davis7 skin was "clear and free of any of the skin 
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conditions." Mrs. Davis told Dr. Swinyer that her skin had been 
clear since June or July of 1991. (R. 0374-0375) 
20. Based on his professional experience, his knowledge of 
contact dermatitis and its causes, his examination of Mrs. Davis, and 
the available medical, personal and legal records, Dr. Swinyer 
expressed his opinion that "Mrs. Davis' skin conditions, (which she 
has described and as depicted in the photographs which she supplied), 
were not the result of chemicals or chemical compounds emitted from 
the Black and Decker iron which she describes in her deposition." 
(R. 0375) 
21. Dr. Swinyer also indicated that Mrs. Davis' "pre-
existing contact eczema and/or preexisting contact dermatitis may 
have been produced by formaldehyde resin commonly found in some 
fabrics used in women's clothing." (R. 0375) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Entering Summary Judgment in View 
of the Plaintiff's Failure to Present Any Medical Expert Testimony 
Linking the Black and Decker Iron to her Skin Condition. 
A major purpose of summary judgment is to allow the parties 
to pierce the pleadings to determine if there are genuine issues of 
fact to present to the factfinder. In a products liability action, 
such as this, where complex medical and technical issues are 
involved, Mrs. Davis was required to present expert testimony in 
support of her contention that the iron caused her skin condition. 
Once Black and Decker had demonstrated that there was no 
expert testimony in the record supporting Mrs. Davis' allegations 
regarding causation, Mrs. Davis could not merely rely on her bare 
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allegations but bore the burden of producing admissible expert 
medical evidence supporting her theories in order to raise an issue 
of material fact. After nearly five years of accusing Black and 
Decker of causing her injury, Mrs. Davis was unable to produce any 
medical expert testimony supporting her allegations, and the trial 
court properly entered summary judgment. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Refusing to 
Order Black and Decker to Perform Chemical Analyses of Each and Every 
Component Part of its Iron. 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that trial courts 
have broad discretion in ruling on discovery matters. Black and 
Decker disclosed all information it had respecting the components 
used in the manufacture of the iron and names and addresses of the 
third parties supplying those components. Additionally, it volun-
teered to supply exemplars for Mrs. Davis' analysis. The trial court 
did not err in refusing to order Black and Decker to go beyond the 
information available to it and perform tests to obtain information 
which the plaintiff could readily obtain by performing her own tests. 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Strike the Affidavit 
of Dr. Leonard Swinyer. 
Mrs. Davis had to produce evidence to create a material 
issue of fact, whether the court struck Dr. Swinyer's affidavit or 
not. However, the trial court properly refused to strike the 
affidavit. 
Expert witnesses can gain personal knowledge by personal 
observation, reliance on the testimony of others, and sources relied 
upon by other experts in the field. Furthermore, an expert witness 
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is competent to testify if the trial court finds that the expert has 
knowledge that can assist the trier of fact. Since Dr. Swinyer's 
affidavit met all these criteria, the trial court justifiably refused 
to strike it. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff attempts to divert the Court's attention by 
taking issue with the trial court's discovery rulings and the 
adequacy of Dr. Swinyer's affidavit. However, the overriding issue 
on this appeal is whether the trial court properly entered summary 
judgment in light of the plaintiff's lack of medical evidence to 
support her claims. The Utah Supreme Court has unequivocally stated 
that one of the major purposes of summary judgment: 
is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the 
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue to present to 
the fact finder. 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 
1984). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has also held that: 
[t]he mere assertion that an issue of fact 
exists without a proper evidentiary foundation 
to support that assertion is insufficient to 
preclude the granting of a summary judgment 
motion. 
Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) . This case presents 
a classic example of a party who, when put to her proof, failed to 
present any evidence demonstrating a material issue of fact 
concerning causation. 
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Mrs. Davis erroneously argues that she bore no burden to 
present evidence in response to Black and Decker's motion, because 
Black and Decker's expert affidavit was deficient and the trial court 
erred in its discovery rulings. In the following paragraphs, Black 
and Decker demonstrates that the law required Mrs. Davis to present 
expert medical testimony to create a material issue of fact regard-
less of the adequacy of Dr. Swinyer's affidavit. Furthermore, not-
withstanding her protestations to the contrary, the trial court 
properly ruled on Mrs. Davis7 discovery requests and the sufficiency 
of Dr. Swinyer's affidavit. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN VIEW OF MRS. DAVIS' FAILURE TO PRODUCE ANY 
MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY SUPPORTING HER ALLEGATIONS 
OF CAUSATION. 
A. Plaintiff Could Not Make A Prime Facie Case Against Black & 
Decker For Negligence, Strict Liability or Breach of Warranty Because 
Plaintiff Did Not Have A Medical Expert Witness. 
Because this case presented highly technical questions of 
medicine and chemistry that were beyond the sphere of the ordinary 
juror, the plaintiff was obligated to provide an expert witness who 
could establish causation. The reasons for this requirement are 
firmly established. First, a defendant should not be required to 
compensate a victim where there is no known scientific basis for her 
claims and where those who are knowledgeable do not support her 
contentions. Furthermore, courts have instituted this requirement in 
certain negligence and strict liability cases, such as those 
involving complex medical issues, because juries need sound founda-
tions for their decisions. Juries cannot be allowed to speculate and 
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must limit their consideration to facts and qualified expert 
testimony. To do otherwise would invite juries to base decisions on 
conjecture, sympathy, and passion. Accordingly, the vast majority of 
courts hold that a plaintiff must have competent, qualified expert 
testimony when medical issues are involved. 
Many courts extend the expert requirement to actions 
against any professionals such as engineers, architects, doctors and 
lawyers, holding that the plaintiff is obligated to establish the 
standard of care applicable to that profession and, through expert 
testimony, to establish that the defendant's actions fell below that 
standard of care. See, e.g., Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct.App. 1987) (in medical malpractice 
action, expert medical testimony required to establish causation); 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P. 2d 348 (Utah 1980) (majority of medical 
malpractice cases require expert testimony); Nauman v. Harold K. 
Beecher & Associates, 467 P.2d 610 (Utah 1970) (breach of a standard 
of care for architects requires expert testimony). 
Likewise, in strict liability actions, courts have 
consistently required that a plaintiff prove the existence of a 
defect, the unreasonably dangerous aspect of the product, and the 
causative nexus to plaintiff's injuries by means of expert witnesses. 
See Fane v. Zimmer, Inc., 927 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991) ; Lee v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 721 F.Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989); Aarnes v. Merck & 
Co., 532 F.Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1980). 
Under the circumstances of this case, the case law is clear 
that plaintiff was obligated to present expert testimony. For 
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example, in Fane v. Zimmer, Inc., 927 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991), 
plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer of an fixation 
device that had been inserted in her hip to aid in healing after a 
fracture. Plaintiff asserted claims of negligent failure to warn and 
strict liability for design defect. The trial court granted a 
directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer stating that plaintiff 
had failed to prove causation because plaintiff had presented no 
expert medical testimony. In affirming the trial court, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
"[t]he issue of causation in such a complicated 
medical case, therefore, was one beyond the 
sphere of the ordinary juryman and required 
expert testimony. . . . Absent competent medical 
expert testimony on the issue of causation, the 
[plaintiff] could not prove the elements of a 
cause of action based in strict products 
liability or negligence. 
Fane, 927 F.2d at 131, 132. 
Similarly, in Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F.Supp. 
89 (D.Md. 1989), plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer of 
a breast implant prosthesis, alleging negligence, strict liability, 
and breach of warranty when the implant ruptured requiring surgical 
intervention. The manufacturer moved for, and was granted, summary 
judgment. After ruling that plaintiff had not identified the defen-
dant as the manufacturer of the ruptured prosthesis, and that she 
failed to establish the elements of failure to warn, the court then 
directed its attention to the fact that plaintiff had not presented 
any expert testimony to support her allegations stating: 
In order to prove her claims of negligence, 
strict liability, and breach of warranty, plain-
tiff must produce evidence that the implants 
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were defective and that the defect was the 
proximate cause of her injury. The testimony of 
an expert witness is indispensable in product 
liability cases when the subject of the infer-
ence is so particularly related to some science 
or profession that it is beyond the ken of the 
ave raae 1avman. 
Lee, 721 F.Supp. at 95 (quoting Virgil v. "Kash N' Karry" Service 
Corp. , 484 A.2d 652 (Md. Ct.App. 1984) (emphasis added) . The Lee 
court further observed: 
The interaction of a breast prothesis with the 
human body raised technical questions requiring 
expert testimony. . . . In the absence of 
expert testimony, the evidence does not permit 
an inference that the leak was caused by a 
defect. . . . It is insufficient to rely merely 
on the occurrence of the rupture to show a 
defect. Proof of a defect in a products 
liability case must rise above speculation and 
recovery cannot be predicated on a presumption 
from the mere happening of an accident. 
Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
As opposing counsel conceded to the trial court (R. 0386, 
0610), expert testimony was likewise needed in the case at hand. The 
interaction between the iron and plaintiff's skin raised complex 
medical and chemical issues. It would have been highly unreasonable 
to expect the average juror to understand and appreciate the complex-
ities of the plaintiff's medical condition without guidance from a 
dermatologist. It would have been equally unreasonable to expect the 
average juror to make the connection between the iron and the plain-
tiff's alleged injuries without the expertise of a physician who 
could explain causation. In sum, it would have been impossible for 
the average juror to have any appreciation or understanding of this 
area of medicine without competent explanations from those who so 
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understand. Furthermore, the plaintiff could not ask a jury to 
simply speculate on causation because she alleged that she suffered 
injury. At trial she would have had to present qualified and 
competent expert testimony to support her claims. 
B. Mrs. Davis Bore the Burden of Presenting Experts in Response to 
the Motion Regardless of the Sufficiency of Dr. Swinyer's Affidavit. 
Both before and during the hearing on Black and Decker's 
motion for summary judgment, Mrs. Davis' counsel readily admitted 
that Mrs. Davis was legally obliged to demonstrate by expert 
testimony that there was a causative link between the Black and 
Decker iron and Mrs. Davis' skin problems. Furthermore, she admitted 
she had no such evidence. (R. 0386, 0610) Nonetheless, Mrs. Davis 
argued below and continues to argue here that even though she did not 
present expert testimony, there was a material issue of fact which 
precluded summary judgment. Mrs. Davis mistakes the burden she bears 
in responding to a motion for summary judgment. 
Mrs. Davis' argument is almost identical to that made by a 
plaintiff in a products liability action ultimately rejected by the 
United States Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In Celotex. the plain-
tiff brought a wrongful death action against Celotex Corporation and 
others alleging that her decedent and been exposed to unreasonably 
dangerous asbestos products. After approximately one year of 
discovery, Celotex brought a motion for summary judgment on the basis 
that the plaintiff had been unable to produce any evidence demon-
strating that Celotex's product had caused the decedent's death. The 
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trial court rendered summary judgment, but the circuit court 
reversed, holding that Celotex had not supported its motion in the 
form of affidavits or otherwise. The United States Supreme Court 
subsequently reversed the Court of Appeals, stating: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) 
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after 
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 
against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case, and on 
which that party will bear the burden of proof 
at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no 
genuine issue as to any material fact," since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essen-
tial element of the non-moving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 
Celotex, 477 U.S. 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2552. The Supreme Court further 
noted the moving party's burden: 
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment 
always bears the initial responsibility of 
informing the district court of the basis for 
its motion, and identifying those portions of 
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any," which it believes 
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. But unlike the Court of Appeals, 
we find no express or implied requirement in 
Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion 
with affidavits or other similar materials 
negating the opponent's claim. [Emphasis by the 
Court.] 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Hence, under the 
federal rules, a plaintiff must respond to a motion for summary 
judgment if the defendant has brought to the court's attention, by 
way of affidavit or simply by reference to the record, that there is 
no evidence concerning an element of the plaintiff's case upon which 
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the plaintiff bears the burden at trial. If the plaintiff fails to 
present evidence, summary judgment is appropriate. 
The courts in other states have readily applied the Celotex 
reasoning to their own rules. For example, in Young v. Key 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 770 P.2d 182, 187 (Wash. 1989), the Washington 
Supreme Court stated: 
In a summary judgment motion, the moving party 
bears the initial burden of showing the absence 
of an issue of material fact. If the moving 
party is a defendant and meets this initial 
showing1, then the inquiry shifts to the party 
with the burden of proof at trial, the plain-
tiff. If, at this point, the plaintiff "fails 
to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that 
party's case, and on which that party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial," then the trial 
court should grant the motion. In Celotex, the 
United States Supreme Court explained this 
result: "In such a situation, there can be 'no 
genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essen-
tial element of the non-moving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." 
xThe moving party may meet the initial burden 
by "' showing' --that is, pointing out to the 
district court--that there is an absence of 
evidence to support the non-moving party's 
case." [Citations omitted.] 
The Colorado Supreme Court similarly followed Celotex in Continental 
Airlines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 712-713 (Colo. 1987), 
observing: 
Whenever summary judgment is sought, the moving 
party bears the initial responsibility of in-
forming the court of the basis for his motion 
and identifying those portions of the record and 
of the affidavits, if any, which he believes 
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. In a case where a party moves 
for summary judgment on an issue on which he 
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would not bear the burden of persuasion at 
trial, his initial burden of production may be 
satisfied by showing the court that there is 
absence of evidence in the record to support the 
nonmoving party's case. 
Once the moving party has met this initial 
burden of production, the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to establish that there is a 
triable issue of fact. If the non-moving party 
cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out a 
triable issue of fact on his claim, a trial 
would be useless and the moving party is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
[Citations omitted.] 
Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly adopted Celotex. See, 
Sparks v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, 768 P.2d 768, 772 
(Idaho 1989); Goradia v. Hahn Co.. 810 P.2d 798, 800 (N.M. 1991); 
Bacon v. Mercy Hospital of Fort Scott, Kansas, 756 P.2d 416, 419 
(Kan. 1988); and Orme School v. Reeves, 802 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. 1990). 
Although this Court has not expressly discussed Celotex in 
the exact context presented here, it has nonetheless cited Celotex 
for the proposition that a court must consider each element of the 
non-moving party's claim and that a non-moving party's failure of 
proof concerning one essential element of the party's case renders 
other facts immaterial. See, Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc. , 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987) and Reeves v. Geicry 
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 642 (Utah App. 1988) . 
The case law overwhelmingly supports the proposition that 
a plaintiff must respond to a motion for summary judgment in the 
circumstances presented here. If the plaintiff fails to produce this 
evidence, summary judgment is appropriate. Even if this Court were 
to determine that Dr. Swinyer's affidavit was inadmissible, Black and 
17 
Decker nonetheless carried its burden of demonstrating through record 
evidence of Mrs. Davis' own treating physicians that there was no 
evidence supporting Mrs. Davis' contentions. In view of Mrs. Davis' 
failure to present expert testimony supporting a causative link, the 
trial court necessarily was obligated to enter summary judgment. 
II. JUDGE MOFFAT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO FORCE BLACK AND 
DECKER TO PERFORM THE PLAINTIFF'S TESTING. 
Mrs. Davis questions the trial court's authority to manage 
discovery in this case. Specifically, she argues that since Black 
and Decker answered her third set of interrogatories without 
objection, the trial court had no discretion thereafter and was 
obliged to order production of all information Mrs. Davis demanded. 
This argument is specious and contrary to well-established case law. 
In State, Road Commission v. Petty, 412 P.2d 914, 17 Utah 
2d 382 (1966) , the Utah Supreme Court observed that discovery can be 
taken to extremes: 
The idea of making a lawsuit a game of tricks by 
keeping information secret to surprise the 
opposition at a critical moment is more suited 
to the fictionalized drama of stories and plays 
than to actual trials in a court of justice. 
Yet the evil to be apprehended in permitting the 
use of discovery to be carried to an opposite 
extreme must also be guarded against. One party 
may sit idly by while the other prepares its 
case with zeal and diligence and then attempt to 
take advantage of this industry by simply asking 
for information, the acquisition of which may 
have involved a great deal of time, effort and 
expense. The possibility of unfairness is 
plainly evident* 
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Petty, 412 P.2d at 917. Due to the possibility of abuse in either of 
these situations, the Supreme Court noted the unique role played by 
the trial courts in achieving a proper balance: 
The question as to whether interrogatories are 
subject to objection as violating that rule or 
for other reasons is primarily for the trial 
court to determine. Because of this fact and 
his advantaged position in proximity to all 
aspects of the lawsuit, it is practical and 
desirable that he be allowed considerable lati-
tude of discretion in his rulings thereon which 
should have the purpose of avoiding extremes 
mentioned above and conforming within the rule 
just quoted, while permitting the proceeding to 
move forward with such efficiency and expedition 
as may be achieved consistent with the proper 
safeguard of the rights of the parties in the 
particular circumstances. 
Petty, 412 P.2d at 918. This Court has also recognized the special 
management role a trial court plays and has reiterated that the trial 
court has broad latitude and discretion in discovery rulings. In 
Schonev v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 585 (Utah App. 
1990), this court noted: 
Management of the actions pending before it is 
uniquely the business of the trial court and 
while an appellate court may, of course, inter-
vene if discretion is abused, we accord trial 
courts considerable latitude in this regard and 
considerable deference in their determinations 
concerning discovery. 
The record amply demonstrates that Judge Moffat's rulings on the 
sufficiency of Black and Decker's answers to Mrs. Davis' third set of 
interrogatories was eminently reasonable and achieved an appropriate 
balance between the interests of the parties. 
Black and Decker was not aware of the chemical composition 
of all of the components supplied by third party manufacturers used 
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in the assembly of the iron. Black and Decker did supply what infor-
mation it had, even offering to provide samples for Mrs. Davis' 
analysis. (R. 0245-0247) Facing the prospect of the costs associ-
ated with performing these chemical analyses, Mrs. Davis apparently 
determined that Black and Decker should be required to obtain this 
information for her and sought the court's assistance in ordering 
Black and Decker to "account for each and every chemical used in 'The 
Classic' metal steam iron." (R. 0280) However, the trial court, 
after a hearing, only required Black and Decker to supply the 
information it had already offered including disclosing the chemicals 
and compounds which were known to it and providing the names and 
addresses of the third-party suppliers, which may have additional 
information. When Mrs. Davis repeatedly questioned the trial court's 
ruling, insisting that Black and Decker provide additional informa-
tion, the trial court finally lost patience reprimanding Mrs. Davis' 
counsel: 
For some reason the plaintiff has some diffi-
culty in understanding the extent and nature to 
which discovery must be responded. Parties are 
not required to do the legal work for other 
parties nor are they required to seek out infor-
mation that can just as easily be obtained by 
the party asking for the discovery. (R. 0354a) 
Although Mrs. Davis contends on this appeal that the trial 
court erred, the very case upon which she relies, Trane Co. v. 
Klutznick, 87 F.R.D. 473 (D.C.W.D. Wis. 1980), states that a party is 
not required to search out new information, but only must provide the 
information which it has. Black and Decker complied with this rule. 
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The trial court achieved an appropriate balance between the 
parties--ordering Black and Decker to disclose the information it had 
but not requiring Black and Decker to expend the time, effort and 
expense of going beyond that information solely for the plaintiff's 
benefit. Clearly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
It is particularly ironic that the plaintiff would accuse 
Black and Decker of being uncooperative in discovery in this case. 
In spite of the clear requirements of Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, plaintiff refused to allow Black and Decker to inspect the 
iron in question, forcing a motion and order on the issue. (R. 0057-
0058, 0158) Furthermore, contrary to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, plaintiff refused to submit to an independent medical 
examination, requiring another motion and order. (R. 0263-0264, 
0273) Ultimately, plaintiff's obstinacy in this case reached a level 
where the court was required to impose sanctions. (R. 0354-0356) 
III. THE SWINYER AFFIDAVIT COMPLIED WITH RULE 56(e), 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Mrs. Davis argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 
strike the affidavit of Dr. Swinyer, and therefore, the judgment must 
be reversed. As previously noted in Point I, the moving party on a 
motion for summary judgment need only draw the trial court's 
attention to an absence in the record of any evidence supporting an 
element of the non-moving party's claim to shift the burden to the 
non-moving party to produce evidence. Black and Decker shifted the 
burden to Mrs. Davis merely by informing the court that none of Mrs. 
Davis' treating physicians supported her theory. Black and Decker 
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additionally filed the affidavit of Dr. Swinyer. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike it. 
The applicable portion of Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, reads as follows: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. 
Dr. Swinyer's affidavit fulfilled all three of these requirements: 
(1) personal knowledge, (2) admissible facts, and (3) demonstrable 
competency to testify. 
A. Dr. Swinver Had Personal Knowledge. 
Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon 
which an expert bases an opinion or inference 
may be those perceived by or made known to the 
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the partic-
ular field in forming opinions or inferences 
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence. 
In interpreting a rule of evidence substantively identical to the 
Utah and federal rules, the Colorado Court of Appeals in Gold Rush 
Investments v. G.E. Johnson Construction, 807 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Colo. 
App. 1990) noted the means by which an expert can gain "personal 
knowledge" to testify: 
CRE 703 incorporates three methods by which an 
expert may acquire knowledge of the facts upon 
which his opinion will be predicated. Under the 
first method, the expert may gather information 
through firsthand observation. The second 
method allows the expert to base his testimony 
upon facts presented at trial, either in the 
form of hypothetical questions propounded by 
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counsel or by way of the evidence presented to 
the trier of fact. The third method permits an 
expert to rely on facts outside the record which 
are not personally observed, but which are of 
the type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
the same field. 11 Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 703.02 (2d ed. 1989) 
Dr. Swinyer's affidavit demonstrates that he had "personal know-
ledge," having obtained the information through the means recognized 
by the courts. 
Dr. Swinyer acquired some of the facts upon which he based 
his opinion through his personal examination of Mrs. Davis. He 
obtained other information through an interview with Mrs. Davis and 
reviewing the deposition testimony of Drs. Sotiriou and Zone. He 
additionally reviewed medical records maintained by Dr. Sotiriou, Dr. 
Zone, the University of Utah Dermatology Clinic, the University of 
Utah ObGyn Department, Dr. Glen Lund and photographs supplied by Mrs. 
Davis. (Addendum 1) All of these methods are recognized as 
appropriate means by which an expert may acquire knowledge necessary 
to support an expert opinion. 
B. All of the Facts Upon Which Dr. Swinver Based His Opinion Are 
Admissible in Evidence. 
There is nothing in Dr. Swinyer's affidavit that could not 
be entered into evidence had this matter proceeded to trial. 
Obviously, Dr. Swinyer's personal observations of the plaintiff are 
admissible. Mrs. Davis' statements to Dr. Swinyer would be admis-
sible as admissions. Drs. Sotiriou and Zone would be available to 
testify either personally or through deposition. Given appropriate 
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foundation, all the medical records and the photographs would be 
admissible as exhibits. 
C. Dr. Swinyer Was Competent to Testify as an Expert Witness. 
In Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the trial court's 
latitude and the appropriate criterion it should use to determine the 
competency of an expert witness: 
A trial court, whether acting as the trier of 
fact or presiding at a jury trial, is granted 
considerable discretion in determining whether 
an expert is qualified to give an opinion on a 
particular matter. * * * The critical factor 
in determining the competency of an expert is 
whether that expert has knowledge that can 
assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues 
before it. 
Dr. Swinyer was eminently qualified to testify as an 
expert. He is a medical doctor specializing in dermatology and is 
board certified not only in dermatology but also dermatopathology. 
His practice emphasizes contact dermatitis and contact eczema, and he 
is considered one of the leading experts in the Salt Lake City area. 
(R. 0373-0374, H1 1-3) Based on his formal training and experience, 
Dr. Swinyer is competent to testify on the origins of contact 
dermatitis and is qualified to determine based on medical records and 
histories, the likelihood that any particular source is the cause of 
a contact dermatitis. 
Dr. Swinyer noted that Mrs. Davis had had contact eczema/ 
contact dermatitis prior to the date of purchase of the Black and 
Decker iron. (R. 0375, 1 9) Furthermore, Mrs. Davis had informed 
him that her skin condition had resolved spontaneously in June or 
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July, 1991. (R. 0375, 1 7)1 Dr. Swinyer further noted that the pre-
existing contact eczema was produced by formaldehyde resins commonly 
found in fabrics in women's clothing. (R. 0375, % 10) Based on this 
evidence, he concluded that the iron did not cause her dermatitis. 
Although Mrs. Davis claims that Dr. Swinyer was not 
competent to testify, the argument is nothing more than an attack on. 
Dr. Swinyer's credibility, calculated to divert attention from her 
failure to support her allegations. The issue before the trial court 
was not whether Dr. Swinyer's testimony was credible but whether Dr. 
Swinyer was competent to testify. Clearly, Dr. Swinyer had knowledge 
and experience sufficient to "assist the trier of fact" and was 
therefore competent. Hence, the trial court properly refused to 
strike the affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the record before the trial court negating any 
causal connection between the iron and Mrs. Davis' skin condition, 
and in view of Mrs. Davis' failure after nearly five years to obtain 
expert testimony in support of her contentions, Rule 56, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, mandated that the trial court enter summary 
judgment. Judge Moffat reasonably exercised his discretion in 
refusing to require Black and Decker to go beyond the information 
available to it and perform testing of third party manufacturers' 
products solely for the purpose of saving the plaintiff the expense 
entailed in obtaining this information. Furthermore, since Dr. 
xMrs. Davis discontinued the use of the iron in the summer, 1990, 
one year earlier than the period her skin resolved. (R. 0693, p. 47) 
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Swinyer was eminently qualified to render his opinion, the trial 
court did not err in refusing to strike the affidavit. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Black and Decker respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
the trial court in all respects. 
DATED this (p day of October, 1993 
CHRISTE: OWELL, P.C. 
jeryp/ cnrrstensei 
DouglasBayly 
Attoyo4eys for Defendants/Appellees 
Brack and Decker 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the //T^day of October, 1993, 
two true and correct copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLEES BLACK AND 
DECKER were mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
1181 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Affidavit of Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D. 
Roger P. Christensen, #0648 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for Black and Decker 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OL EVE L00MIS DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.)/ INC., 
(a Maryland corporation 
authorized to do business in 
the State of Utah, and a sub-
i! sidiary of Black and Decker 
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK and 
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a 
Maryland corporation, 
Defendants. 
'i 
STATE OF UTAH : 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
I, Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D., being first duly sworn upon 
oath, do hereby testify as follows: 
1. I am a medical doctor specializing in dermatology, 
currently engaged in the private practice of medicine in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
2. I am board certified in dermatology and 
dermatopathology. I have been a licensed physician since 1966 and 
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AFFIDAVIT OF 
LEONARD J. SWINYER, M.D. 
Civil No. 89-0907651 CV 
Judge Moffatt 
board certified in Dermatology since 1973. 
3. Contact dermatitis and contact eczema have been areas 
of emphasis in my practice and I am generally considered as one of 
the leading experts in Salt Lake City in those areas. 
4. I was retained as a dermatology expert by the 
attorneys representing Black & Decker in the above case to conduct 
a dermatology analysis and examination with respect to the 
plaintiff, 01 Eve Loomis Davis. I saw Mrs. Davis in my office on 
February 25, 1992. 
5. As part of my analysis I have reviewed the 
photographs provided in this case by the plaintiff of the 
dermatological conditions at issue in this case. I also 
interviewed Mrs. Davis, reviewed her deposition and reviewed the 
written medical history she provided. I have also reviewed the 
following medical records and materials: 
a. Records of Dr. Leo Sotiriou; 
b. Records of the University of Utah Dermatology 
Clinic, Dr. John Zone; 
c. Records of the University of Utah OB/GYN 
Department; 
d. Records of the Ear, Nose and Throat Center of 
Salt Lake City, Dr. Glen K. Lund; 
e. The depositions of Drs. Sotiriou and Zone. 
6. Based on my own examination, as well as the 
statements of Mrs. Davis and the information she provided, it was 
"
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apparent to me that on the date of the examination, (February 25, 
1992), Mrs. Davis' skin was clear and free of any of the skin 
conditions which Mrs. Davis describes in her deposition and/or 
which are depicted in the photographs which she has provided. 
7. Mrs. Davis informed me that her skin became clear 
last June or July, spontaneously, and has remained clear since. It 
is my understanding that she is not currently taking any 
medications for contact dermatitis or contact eczema, and that she 
was not taking such medications since her skin cleared. 
8. Based on my training and experience, my examination 
and interview of Mrs. Davis, my review of the photographs, 
depositions and medical records and the other information I have 
been provided, as well as my professional judgment, it is my 
opinion that Mrs. Davis7 skin conditions, (which she has described 
and as depicted in the photographs which she supplied), were not 
the result of chemicals or chemical compounds emitted from the 
Black & Decker iron which she describes in her deposition. 
9. It is apparent from the medical records and 
depositions that Mrs. Davis had contact eczema and/or contact 
dermatitis prior to 1987, which is when she has stated that she 
purchased the Black & Decker iron. 
10. Based on the information which has been provided to 
me, I believe that her pre-existing contact eczema and/or contact 
dermatitis may have been produced by formaldehyde resins commonly 
found in some fabrics used in women's clothing. 
-3-
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DATED this I day of^Apr^l) 1992. 
TWJU/- Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
%kp*il( 1992. 
day of 
U^4£/l P/A/uJ 
N o t a r y P u b l i c ^ ot
Residing at: ^^t\UJ^ 
My commission expires: [b~ (-tfji * ? ;•' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE -, O' 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Leonard J. 
Swinyer, M.D. was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to: 
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1181 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motioix^nd proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence," and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
